History of trademark, trademark law

A "trademark" is defined under R.A. 166, the Trademark Law, as including "any word, name, symbol, emblem, sign or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured, sold or dealt in by others."^[1] This definition has been simplified in R.A. No. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which defines a "trademark" as "any visible sign capable of distinguishing goods."^[2] 

In Philippine jurisprudence, the function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed; to secure to him, who has been instrumental in bringing into the market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill; to assure the public that they are procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and imposition; and to protect the manufacturer against substitution and sale of an inferior and different article as his product.^[3]

 

Modern authorities on trademark law view trademarks as performing three distinct functions: (1) they indicate origin or ownership of the articles to which they are attached; (2) they guarantee that those articles come up to a certain standard of quality; and (3) they advertise the articles they symbolize.^[4]

Symbols have been used to identify the ownership or origin of articles for several centuries.^[5] As early as 5,000 B.C., markings on pottery have been found by archaeologists. Cave drawings in southwestern Europe show bison with symbols on their flanks.^[6] Archaeological discoveries of ancient Greek and Roman inscriptions on sculptural works, paintings, vases, precious stones, glassworks, bricks, etc. reveal some features which are thought to be marks or symbols. These marks were affixed by the creator or maker of the article, or by public authorities as indicators for the payment of tax, for disclosing state monopoly, or devices for the settlement of accounts between an entrepreneur and his workmen.^[7]

In the Middle Ages, the use of many kinds of marks on a variety of goods was commonplace. Fifteenth century England saw the compulsory use of identifying marks in certain trades. There were the baker's mark on bread, bottlemaker's marks, smith's marks, tanner's marks, watermarks on paper, etc.^[8] Every guild had its own mark and every master belonging to it had a special mark of his own. The marks were not trademarks but police marks compulsorily imposed by the sovereign to let the public know that the goods were not "foreign" goods smuggled into an area where the guild had a monopoly, as well as to aid in tracing defective work or poor craftsmanship to the artisan.^[9] For a similar reason, merchants also used merchants' marks. Merchants dealt in goods acquired from many sources and the marks enabled them to identify and reclaim their goods upon recovery after shipwreck or piracy.^[10]

With constant use, the mark acquired popularity and became voluntarily adopted. It was not intended to create or continue monopoly but to give the customer an index or guarantee of quality.^[11] It was in the late 18th century when the industrial revolution gave rise to mass production and distribution of consumer goods that the mark became an important instrumentality of trade and commerce.^[12] By this time, trademarks did not merely identify the goods; they also indicated the goods to be of satisfactory quality, and thereby stimulated further purchases by the consuming public.^[13] Eventually, they came to symbolize the goodwill and business reputation of the owner of the product and became a property right protected by law.^[14] The common law developed the doctrine of trademarks and tradenames "to prevent a person from palming off his goods as another's, from getting another's business or injuring his reputation by unfair means, and, from defrauding the public."^[15] Subsequently, England and the United States enacted national legislation on trademarks as part of the law regulating unfair trade.^[16] It became the right of the trademark owner to exclude others from the use of his mark, or of a confusingly similar mark where confusion resulted in diversion of trade or financial injury. At the same time, the trademark served as a warning against the imitation or faking of products to prevent the imposition of fraud upon the public.^[17]

Today, the trademark is not merely a symbol of origin and goodwill; it is often the most effective agent for the actual creation and protection of goodwill. It imprints upon the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfaction. In other words, the mark actually sells the goods.^[18] The mark has become the "silent salesman," the conduit through which direct contact between the trademark owner and the consumer is assured. It has invaded popular culture in ways never anticipated that it has become a more convincing selling point than even the quality of the article to which it refers.^[19] In the last half century, the unparalleled growth of industry and the rapid development of communications technology have enabled trademarks, tradenames and other distinctive signs of a product to penetrate regions where the owner does not actually manufacture or sell the product itself. Goodwill is no longer confined to the territory of actual market penetration; it extends to zones where the marked article has been fixed in the public mind through advertising.^[20] Whether in the print, broadcast or electronic communications medium, particularly on the Internet,^[21] advertising has paved the way for growth and expansion of the product by creating and earning a reputation that crosses over borders, virtually turning the whole world into one vast marketplace.

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[1] Sec. 38, par. 2, R.A. 166.

[2] Sec. 121.1, Part III, R.A. 8293.

[3] Gabriel v.Perez, 55 SCRA 406, 417 [1974] citing 52 Am Jur, p. 508; Etepha v.Director of Patents, 16 SCRA 495, 497 [1966]; see also Phil. Refining Co., Inc. v.Ng Sam, 115 SCRA 472, 476-477 [1982]; also cited in Agpalo, Trademark Law and Practice in the Philippines, p. 5 [1990].

[4] Dissenting Opinion of Justice Florentino Feliciano in Philip Morris, Inc. v.Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 576, 624 [1993]; see William Jay Gross, The Territorial Scope of Trademark Rights, Univ.of Miami Law Review, vol 44:1075 [March 1990]; see also Rudolf Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks, vol. 2, pp. 804-814 [1945].

[5] Harry D. Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trademarks, 4th ed., pub. by Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., vol. 1, p. 509 [1947].

[6] Frank H. Foster and Robert L. Shook, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks, pub. by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed. p. 19 [1993].1

[7] Stephen P. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights, National and International Protection (Harvard University Press), vol. 1, pp. 3-4 [1975].

[8] Foster and Shook, supra, at 20.

[9] Id., at 20-21; Ladas, supra, vol. 1, at 4-5; see Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harvard Law Review, 813, 814 [1927]; Callmann, supra, vol. 2, p. 807; see also Richard Wincor and Irving Mandell, Copyright, Patents and Trademarks: The Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, at 72 [1980].

[10] Foster and Shook, supra, at 20; Schechter, supra, at 814.

[11] Callmann, supra, vol. 2, at 808.

[12] Foster and Shook, supra, at 22-23; Nims, supra, at 511.

[13] Callmann, supra, vol. 2, at 809-910.

[14] Foster and Shook, supra, at 21-22.

[15] Justice Holmes in Chadwick v.Covell, 151 Man 190, 23 NE 1068, 1069 [1890]; also cited in Nims, supra, at 37.

[16] Ladas, supra, vol. 1, at 8.

[17] See also Dissenting Opinion of Justice Feliciano in Philip Morris, supra, at 624-625.

[18] Schechter, supra. Trademarks have become products in their own right, valued as status symbols and indicators of the preferences and aspirations of those who use them - Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, New York University Law Review, vol. 68: 960, 965-966 [Oct. 1993].

[19] Kozinski, supra, at 965-966; Callmann, supra, vol. 2, at 881-812 [1945], citing Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trademarks [1925], Note 15, p. 64.

[20] Gross, supra, at 1099-1100; see also Dissenting opinion of Justice Feliciano in Philip Morris, supra, at 625-626.

[21] The Internet is a decentralized computer network linked together through routers and communications protocols that enable anyone connected to it to communicate with others likewise connected, regardless of physical location. Users of the Internet have a wide variety of communication methods available to them and a tremendous wealth of information that they may access. The growing popularity of the Net has been driven in large part by the World Wide Web, i.e., a system that facilitates use of the Net by sorting through the great mass of information available on it. Advertising on the Net and cybershopping are turning the Internet into a commercial marketplace.-- Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace:Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, Minnesota Law Review, vol. 82: 609-611, 615-618 [Feb. 1998].